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Reflections in Three Mirrors:
Complexities of Representation in a Constitutional
Democracy
PETER M. SHANE*
In his Frank Strong Lecture, Professor Peter Shane responds to commentators
who have embraceda particularly strong view of the unitary presidency that would
legitimate virtually unlimited executive discretion in the conduct offoreign policy
and public administration. Professor Shane argues insteadfor a robust version of
checks and balances in which Congress enjoys a substantial role in shaping the
exercise of executivepower and thejudiciary conscientiously constrains both of the
elected branches to adhere to constitutional principles. He contends that only a
vigorous system of checks and balances can implement the philosophy of
representation embedded in the Constitution.
According to Professor Shane, the Constitution embodies the view that
effective representation can be accomplished only through an amalgam ofdifferent
political institutions, with different constituencies, authorities, capacities, and
decisional processes. He identifies a variety of possible meanings for
"representation" and traces the evolution of ideas about representation in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. He argues that the framers designed a system
of three branches, each of which they regarded as equally "representative. " Unless
public policy reflects substantial interaction among the branches, it is unlikely to
reflect the quality of deliberation that the framers intended their new representative
government to exhibit.
I. INTRODUCTION:
REPRESENTATION AND CHECKS AND BALANCES
It is a very great honor to have been invited by Ohio State to be part of a Law
Forum named for Frank R. Strong. Dean Strong's record as both scholar and
educational leader is a distinguished one, and the burden of living up to the
standards embodied in his work is daunting. He once wrote of constitutionalists who
engage in a "disregard for [the] historic meaning" of the Constitution to the point
of what he called "the opposite extreme of indulgence in spurious
noninterpretivism."'I I hope what I say here will not fall prey to that indictment.
Indeed, I hope I can help succeed in reawakening us to a fundamental aspect of the
* Professor of Lav and former Dean, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.
I am deeply grateful to Dean Gregory Howard Williams and to the faculty of The Ohio State
University College of Law for the invitation to deliver this address as the 1998 Frank R. Strong
Law Forum Lecture.
1 FRANK R. STRONG, SUBSTANTVE DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A DICHOTOMY OF SENSE AND
NONSENSE, at vii (1986).
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historic Constitution-its approach to the problem of representation-although I
confess at the outset that the conceptualization of representation I proffer here takes
on at least a vocabulary different from that of the founding generation.
The focus of most of my own scholarship in recent years has been the law and
practice of separation of powers at the national level. Through a number of articles,
I have tried to champion a fairly robust view of constitutional checks and balances.
I have argued, with regard to law enforcement 2 presidential regulatory
policymaking,3 and policymaking in war time4 that our government is best served
by implementing a constitutional vision that embraces interbranch dialogue, mutual
accountability, and extended deliberation. I have argued that a government
committed to such principles is most likely to produce decisions that are sound,
lawful, coherent effective, and widely accepted as legitimate.
In significant part, this body of work has been framed as a response to another
current school of thought that is antagonistic to checks and balances. I call this
competing school of thought "presidentialism," because it embraces a particularly
strong view of the so-called "unitary Presidency" as a way of promoting efficiency,
coherence, and accountability in policymaking. Led, in the judiciary, by Justice
Antonin Scalia,5 and, among academics, chiefly by Professor Steven Calabresi6 of
Northwestern University, the presidentialists read into the Constitution not merely
the possibility, but also the legal command (or set of legal commands) that
Presidents enjoy virtually unlimited discretion in the conduct of both foreign policy
and public administration on the domestic front. In their hands, our Constitution of
1787 becomes very nearly the Constitution of the Fifth French Republic 7 (although
Professor Calabresi, to his credit, does oppose recognition of an inherent
presidential decree power).8
2 See Peter M. Shane, Presidents, Pardons, and Prosecutors: LegalAccountability and the
Separation ofPowers, 11 YALEL. & POL'YREV. 361 (1993).
3 See Peter M. Shane, PoliticalAccountability in a System ofChecks and Balances: The Case
ofPresidential Review ofRulemaking, 48 ARK. L. REV. 161 (1995).
4 See Peter M. Shane, Learning McNamara's Lessons: How the War Powers Resolution
Advances the Rule of Law, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1281 (1997).
5 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
6 See Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments For The Unitary Executive, 48 ARK.
L. REV. 23 (1995) [hereinafter Calabresi, Normative Arguments]; Steven G. Calabresi &
Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute The Laws, 104 YALE L. 541 (1994);
Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural
Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1992); Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The
Unitary Executive During The First Half-century, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1451 (1997).
7 For a discussion of executive power under the French constitution, see JOHN BELL, FRENCH
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (1992).
81 think it is not normatively desirable to give presidents a decree lawmaking power to alter
what Professor Monaghan calls the background distribution of private rights. As I explained
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In lecturing about these issues, I have always been bedeviled by a particular
handicap that dabblers in this field of law must endure-there is precious little
"separation of powers" humor with which to lighten the subject matter. Almost five
years ago, at a University of Michigan constitutional law conference, that problem
was somewhat alleviated for me. Lying half-awake the night before a separation of
powers panel on which I was scheduled to speak, I received a vision of a black-
robed man, slick of hair and full of beard, reciting a venerable genre of poetry. He
intoned:
Said Scalia, "Since I've been a jurist,
Of one thing I have always been surest.
When the past is a mystery,
I just make up the history.
It keeps my originalism purest."
I hope this is not taken to be too cheap a shot at Justice Scalia, but I can tell you
what inspired the poem. Without citation to any historical sources beyond The
Federalist (which, in my view, he misreads), Justice Scalia insisted in Morrison v.
Olson, the Supreme Court case upholding the independent counsel law, that a
proper reading of the historical Constitution absolutely mandates his rigidly
categorical approach to the interpretation of executive power.9 As a matter of fact,
he is wrong about the relevant history, as several distinguished writers have pointed
out at length and in eloquent and persuasive detail.10 Executive power did not mean
to the Framers what it means to Justice Scalia. From an originalist perspective, our
institutions of national government have substantial discretion under the
Constitution to shape their degree of mutual engagement or independence. And they
are not bound by a rigid constitutional categorization of executive power that
precludes strong checks and balances on the Presidency.
But, even if the Presidentialists are engaging in "spurious interpretivism," to
at various points above, there is too great a risk that popular presidents backed by national
majorities will impose unfair burdens on individuals or on small and unpopular groups.
Calabresi, Normative Arguments, supra note 6, at 96.
9 See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 698-99 (Scalia, J., dissenting). To be fair, I should note that
Justice Scalia does cite M. Farrand's Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 for the
uncontroversial proposition that "[p]roposals to have multiple executives, or a council of advisers
with separate authority were rejected" by the framers. Id. at 699.
10 Seegenerally GERHARD CASPER, SEPARATwNG POWER: ESSAYS ON THE FOUNDING PERIOD
(1997); Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALEL.J. 1725 (1996); William B.
Gwyn, The Indeterminacy ofthe Separation ofPowers and the Federal Courts, 57 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 474 (1989); William B. Gwyn, The Indeterminacy of the Separation ofPowers in the Age
of the Framers, 30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 263 (1989).
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vary a bit from Dean Strong's phrasing, they may still have their way as a matter of
political reality. That is because, if I am correct that the Constitution confers upon
the three branches substantial legal discretion to shape their degree of mutual
engagement or independence, the three branches could exercise that discretion in
a manner that licenses a largely autonomous executive of the sort that Justice Scalia
would champion. The fact that our legislative branch could hold the executive
tightly to account does not require it to do so.11 Our judiciary, through various
doctrines of prudence and self-restraint, could substantially forbear from engaging
in judicial review of the executive.12 In short, Congress and the courts could be true
to the letter of the Constitution, but false to its spirit.
That is why, if the spirit of checks and balances is to prevail in American
government, it is not enough to interpret what the Constitution commands. It is
imperative to outline a normative vision of how our government should work that,
in turn, is powerful enough to inspire the three branches in exercising their
discretion over the structure and operation of interbranch dialogue. It is important
to go further than showing that a robust theory of checks and balances is an
available idea; it must be shown to be a good idea, or we will not long have it.
My thesis is that an important normative case for embracing a strong version
of checks and balances rests on the congruence between such a system and the
philosophy of representation most obviously embedded in our Constitution. That
philosophy, I believe, can be succinctly summarized as follows: Whatever
representation is--or, perhaps more helpfully, whatever representation does-it can
be implemented only through an amalgam of different kinds of political institutions.
These institutions differ in their constituencies, their processes, their authorities,
their capacities, and in their modes of organization and selection. But they are all co-
equal in their claims to representativeness because of three different features. First,
each is constituted by a process governed either by "the people" themselves or by
those chosen by the electorate to assemble the institution in question. Second, each
is bound to "We, the People" as a fiduciary for our interests. Third, each participates
in a process of mutual constraint and legitimation among government institutions
11 Cf. Stephen W. Stathis, Executive Cooperation: Presidential Recognition of the
Investigative Authority of Congress and the Courts, 3 J.L. & POL. 183 (1986) (documenting the
willingness of the executive branch to share with Congress even information it might legally
withhold under plausible claims of privilege).
12 Among the judicially crafted "prudential" standing rules that the Court invokes in order
to justify not hearing cases concededly within both its constitutional and statutoryjurisdiction are
rules against so-called third-party standing, see United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960), and
requiring federal plaintiffs to show that the interests they seek to advance in litigation fall within
the "zone of interests" arguably sought to be protected by the constitutional or statutory provisions
whose coverage the plaintiffs seek to invoke. See Air Courier Conference of Am. v. Am. Postal
Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517 (1991).
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that is essential to what Hamilton called government from reflection and choice.13
This is not the only way of interpreting the Constitution's approach to
representation, although I am hardly alone in identifying it.14 We could dismiss the
Constitution's eclecticism in institutional design as the mere artifact of compromise,
not as the expression of an ideal. Some who ratified the Constitution were surely
democrats who nonetheless felt compelled to accept the elitism of the Senate and
Executive. Others were elitists constrained to allow the relative populism of the
House. Some were states-rights advocates who nonetheless relented in a national
government operating directly on the people. Others might better be seen as
nationalists who resigned themselves to a large measure of federalism. What I
propose, however, is that we do not view the tensions embodied in the Constitution
as instances of greater or lesser fidelity to some purer, singular principle of political
representation. Rather, I would view those tensions as affiming a positive
understanding of political legitimacy-namely, that the wide variety of functions
Americans want representative government to accomplish and the qualities
Americans want that government to honor demand a complex network of
competing, but interdependent sources of authority. In this sense, each of our three
branches of government is importantly a representative branch of government, and
it is important to our popular sense of government legitimacy that we understand
how 'We, the People" are represented in each branch. Hence, the "three mirrors"
of my title.
13 See THE FEDERALISTNO. 1, at 33 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
14 Precisely because the Federalists considered "every branch of the constitution and
govemment to be popular" and regarded the president Senate, and even the judiciary as well
as the House of Representatives as somehow all equal agents of the people's will, they could
more easily than their opponents justify the separation and protection of each branch "by the
strongest provisions, that until this day have occurred to mankind."
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 549 (1969); cf.
Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of The Governed: Against Simple Rules For a Complex World,
72 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 987,988-89 (1997). Farina states:
No single institution or practice is capable of performing the multiple tasks of registering,
interpreting, educating, adapting, affording participation, facilitating deliberation, brokering
accommodation, and umpiring conflict that are (or at least ought to be) entailed in shaping
the public policy of a post-industrialized democracy with an activist regulatory govemment
There are no simple rules for this complex world. Rather, we must necessarily look to a




If. THE AMBIGUITIES AND EVOLUrION OF "REPRESENTATION"
Representation is a notoriously elusive concept. The best approach to its
understanding is a bit indirect. I shall start by highlighting at least four things that
are frequently equated with the concept of "representation," but, rather than choose
among them a priori, I would like to focus on the problems representation was
intended to solve for the founding generation. Only then do I believe we can speak
sensibly about what counts as political representation in the constitutional sense and
about the implications of the constitutional conception of representation for
separation of powers theory.15
When we speak of representation in everyday conversation-when we say that
we are "represented" in court, or in the legislature, or in a faculty senate, for
example-there are at least four distinct meanings that could easily be associated
with our words. First, we could be saying there is someone in a decisionmaking or
decision-influencing position whom we helped select. We chose the person who
acts in our name. There is someone who is our representative because they
legitimately have a decisionmaking role, and they legitimately have that role
precisely because we participated in the process of giving them the authority they
now possess. Our representative is, in this sense, our delegate.
Alternatively, we could say and often do say we are "represented" because
there is someone in a decisionmaking or decision-influencing position who
resembles us in some special aspect of our personal circumstances. Today, because
of the intensification of identity politics, this concern-sometimes called "the
politics ofpresence"---is much discussed.16 But the features by which we today tend
to measure our presence-perhaps most frequently, race and gender-by no means
exhaust the elements of identity or interest that have shaped the politics of presence
throughout American history. Divisions between farmer and merchant, between
labor and capital, and between North, South, and West have all been as salient in
their time as are the different dimensions of identity that preoccupy our politics
today. Those who represent us, in this sense, are our identity surrogates.
Third, we sometimes say we are represented because someone in a
decisionmaking or decision-influencing position is obligated, all things being equal,
to articulate preferences regarding any particular decision that are identical to our
preferences. If we would vote for something, they must vote for it. They must
oppose what we oppose. In this light, our representative is our proxy. He or she
contributes to decisionmaling just what we would contribute if we were physically
present and authorized to participate ourselves. Our representatives in this sense are
15 A now-classic analysis of the multiple meanings of representation is HANNA FENIC-EL
PrKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1967). Although my taxonomy is expressed
somewhat differently from Pitdn's, we are discussing similar phenomena.
16 See generally ANNE PILLPS, THE POLmCS OF PRESENCE (1995).
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our spokespeople. It is this theory of representation that was best captured in the
eighteenth century practice of sending instructions to one's representatives. 17
Finally, we say we are represented in a decisionmaking process if that process
is required to take account of our interests. If our welfare cannot properly be
disregarded in a decisionmaking process or if our interests cannot lawfully be
intruded upon without some strong, public-regarding justification, then we are
represented in yet a different sense from those mentioned above. Our
representatives in this sense are our fiduciaries.
There are limited circumstances when it is almost possible to imagine that a
single representative could be delegate, identity surrogate, spokesperson, and
fiduciary all at once-when we vote for a victorious candidate who looks like us
and who faithfilly articulates our preferences which, as it happens, coincide with
our best interests. But this rarely occurs so happily. To take extreme examples,
African Americans may accept Clarence Thomas as their identity surrogate on the
Supreme Court; he is typically not their spokesperson. The President may be a
fiduciary for permanent resident aliens, but he is not their delegate, and so on.
Although, in thinking about representation, many of us would regard each aspect I
have highlighted as being of serious concern to us, the analytic distinctiveness of
each aspect ofrepresentation and the reality that they can rarely all be optimized at
once makes talking about representation seem often to verge on incoherence.
The changeability of the meaning of representation is of special concern in
understanding our Constitution because, between the late seventeenth century until
the end of the eighteenth century, there was a series of changes in British, and
ultimately in the American, understanding of the relationship of people to
government that was nothing short of revolutionary. 18 Although perhaps not voiced
in this way, what made these changes revolutionary for the law of political
representation was the transformation being worked in the notions of representation
as delegated action, identity surrogacy, proxy advocacy, and fiduciary
decisionmaking. What follows is the barest of outlines of these changes, bearing in
mind that hindsight exhibits all of these developments with greater clarity than was
perceived by those who lived through them.
The English, at mid-seventeenth century, held to a theory of mixed government
under which "the presence in the legislature of the three estates of monarchy,
aristocracy, and people would prevent the constitution from degenerating into the
17 See generally JOHN p RED, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION IN THE AGE OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLutION 96-109 (1989).
18 Gordon Wood has provided the most influential historical account of this evolution. See
WOOD, supra note 14, at 162-255, 344-89, 593-615, and passim; see also JACK N. RAKOVE,
ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLMncs AND IDEAs IN THE MAKING OF THE CONsTrrUTION 203-43
(1997).
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corrupt forms of tyranny, oligarchy, or anarchy." 19 This was not a theory of
separation of powers, but something more like a scientific model that postulated a
congruence between the natural order of society and the ideal form of government
Just as nature dictated that society would comprise "monarchy, aristocracy, and
people," so, too, would a well-constituted government embody monarchy in the
Crown, nobility in a House of Lords, and the people in a House of Commons. 20
Separation of powers theory-or, one might say with equal justice, separation
of functions theory-evolved in the mid-seventeenth century as a way of critiquing,
first, the Crown abuses leading to the regicide of 1649 and then, the abuses of the
Long Parliament that led to restoration of the monarchy and the House of Lords.21
Its premise was that the organs of government were distinguished not only by the
estates they represented, but also by the tasks to which they were best suited.22 John
Locke's classic writings in the last third of the seventeenth century built on these
political arguments, holding, in essence, that it ought to be the constitutional
function of parliament to enact general laws and the constitutional function of the
executive to attend to the work-a-day business of administration.23 (in this view of
things, judicial power was subsumed by the executive. Executing the law entailed
enforcement of the judgments of the courts.24) But what is important to recall,
especially because the colonists were enthusiasts of the British Constitution, is that
their inherited wisdom did not originally defend the structure of constitutional
government according to its congruence with a theory of governmental function.
Rather, the colonists defended it according to its congruence with a particular theory
of representation, in which the different estates of society were literally embodied
in the whole of Parliament, including the King. The attribution to that structure of
an appropriate separation of powers came later.
This picture of Parliament seems amazing to the twentieth century mind
because it posits a notion of representation that partakes only in a small way of
delegation, identity surrogacy, or, through the occasional mechanism of so-called
"instructions," proxy voting. Commons mirrored the people in the sense that
commoners constituted its membership, but there was nothing like "one person, one
vote" to make Parliament truly the people's delegates. It mirrored the people partly
in a geographic sense, but many electoral centers went virtually unrepresented, and
19 RAKOVE, supra note 18, at 245 (emphasis omitted).
20 See id. at 245; WOOD, supra note 14, at 19.
21 See RAKOVE, supra note 18, at 246.
22 See id. at 245-46; WLLIAM B. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
26(1965).
23 See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOvERNMENT, §§ 142-44,159 (T.P. Peardon ed.,
1952); WOOD, supra note 14, at 25-26.
24 See RAKOVE, supra note 18, at 247; WOOD, supra note 14, at 159,454.
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the Crown, directly or indirectly, controlled many a borough.25 There was no
attempt to include women or other then-subordinate classes of the social hierarchy
in direct decisionmaking. 26 There was no particular mechanism to ensure that the
membership of Commons would mirror the people's sentiments or their interests,
taken as individuals.
But the people were represented, and they largely deemed themselves
represented, because they accepted the fiduciary character of Parliament. This
theory of representation, known then, as now, as "virtual representation," was
especially understandable because of the then-accepted purpose of representation.
That purpose was not the translation of popular sentiment into positive statutory
enactments. Rather, the function of representation, its central importance to the
English theory of liberty, was its guarantee that arbitrary Crown authority would be
checked through a political body protective of what was understood to be the
corporate interests of the people.27 When the Glorious Revolution established the
supremacy of Parliament, it did not signify a role for popular representatives to
engage in deliberative lawmaking. Rather, in the words of Edmund Burke, the
Commons was to provide "a vigilant and jealous eye over the executory and judicial
magistracy; an anxious care of public money; an openness, approaching towards
facility, to public complaint" 28 It was thus the fiduciary aspect of representation that
loomed largest in common understanding of how Parliament consented to the
exercise of power. Consent was established through the action of legislators drawn
from the people, though hardly mirroring them, and acting with their best interests
in mind.
When transported to North America, this model of government was replicated
in colonial governments bearing a superficial resemblance to Crown, Lords, and
Commons. The governor in each colony had prerogative powers, which he
exercised under authority from the Crown.29 In nearly every colony, a colonial
council functioned as part upper legislative chamber and part advisory executive
council.30 And, in every colony, an elected assembly performed the parliamentary
function of representing the people to the magistracy.31
But this triumvirate of institutions differed in at least three key ways from their
counterparts in the mother country. First, although the upper councils were thought
25 See WOOD, supra note 14, at 170-71.
26 See JAMES MORONE, THE DEMOCRATIC WISH: POPULAR PARTICIPATION AND THE LIMs
OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 41 (1990).
27 See id. at 35; RAKOVE, supra note 18, at 209; REID, supra note 17, at 28.
28 RAKOVE, supra note 18, at 209 (quoting Edmund Burke).
2 9 See RAKOVE, supra note 18, at 249.
30 See WOOD, supra note 14, at 159.
31 See Reid, supra note 17, at 31.
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more likely to include the natural social and intellectual elite of society, they did not
represent a separate estate. There was no nobility. The councils thus did not have as
their mission serving a corporate interest adverse to or even different from the
interests of the people as a whole. Second, the colonial assemblies actually
legislated more than did Parliament. As John Philip Reid has written, these
assemblies settled by law many questions that Parliament despite its own steady
transformation into a legislating body, did not take up until the nineteenth century.3 2
Third, the assemblies rested on a much broader franchise. Although, as in England,
there was no "identity surrogacy" for women, for slaves, or for other subordinated
classes, the assemblies were far more truly the people's delegates than was
Parliament. The franchise in the colonies extended far beyond freeholders, and there
was a far tighter bond than in England between constituent and representative.3 3 In
this social milieu, it is no wonder that the salutary distribution of functions among
the branches of government came to be a more important rationale for balanced
constitutionalism than the recreation of the social order. Tripartite government in
America simply did not replicate estates in American society.
By the 1760s, the colonists' experience of self-government had undermined
their acceptance of the assertion that they were virtually represented in Parliament
and thus could legitimately be taxed there. Their problem was not with the theory
of virtual representation per se; they accepted that individual citizens could be
represented by others. Rather, they rejected the notion that both colonists and those
in the mother country retained a unity of interest34 Thus, the interests of a colonist
could be represented by another colonist but they could not be represented by a
body of commoners who did not share those interests.
By the eve of the Revolution, however, the theory of virtual representation in
America was under attack. The perceived English abuses of the 1760s and 1770s
caused the colonists, increasingly through direct action, to seize authority from
Crown officials. The efforts at independence to form new governments for the states
followed years of experience in which "We, the People" seemed truly to rule
themselves, through conventions, mass meetings, mobs, and citizen committees, as
much as through representative assemblies.35 The imperative of government design
became the re-creation of the people themselves in their new governments. John
Adams wrote in 1776 that a representative assembly "should be in miniature an
exact portrait of the people at large. It should think, feel, reason and act like them. 36
In this formulation, the theories of delegation, identity surrogacy, and proxy voting
32 See id. at 30; RAKOVF, supra note 18, at 212-13.
33 See REID, supra note 17, at 41; RAKOVE, supra note 18, at 212.
34 See WOOD, supra note 14, at 176-78.
35 See id. at 313-14, 319-28; MoRONE, supra note 26, at 53-56.
36 WOOD, supra note 14, at 165 (quoting John Adams).
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merge. A broadly enfranchised people would choose their representatives, who
would resemble them and would "act like them." Moreover, there was to be no
dissonance between these new republican assemblies and the fiduciary conception
of government. That is because the genuine interest of the people was actually a
shared, homogeneous interest-a vision plausible chiefly because Americans
viewed themselves as arrayed against a common enemy, and they still took the
assertion of the interests of the people as against their rulers to be the essential
representative task.37 Because there was no nobility and, of course, no crown as a
separate estate, the revolutionary governments either did away with their chief
magistracies or made them utterly subservient to the legislative branch.38
What happened between 1776 and 1789 is an oft-told tale. Under the pressures
of actually governing, the interests of the people turned out not to be
homogeneous. 39 The delegate model of the Continental Congress, which required
virtual consensus for meaningful action, proved frustrating.0 At the state level, the
evisceration of the so-called magisterial power had wreaked havoc with government
administration and the faithful execution of the laws, especially tax laws.41 In
federalist ideology, it became as critical a function of government to protect the
individual against the majority, as to protect the people as a collectivity from any
executive magistracy.42
It is hard to exaggerate how differently the constitutional delegates meeting in
Philadelphia thus confronted questions of representation as compared to the makers
of state constitutions just a little over a decade earlier. In 1776, the cure for
factionalism was to represent the whole people as directly as possible in a legislature
that clearly dominated the other branches of government.43 This was because the
people shared a common public interest, which all felt and which, properly
assembled, all would express.44 By 1787, however, James Madison could write in
his famous Federalist No. 10 of "a faction," meaning a group of persons "who are
united and actuated by some common impulse ofpassion, or of interest, adverse to
the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the
37 See id. at 57-58; RAKOVE, supra note 18, at 213-14.
38 See WOOD, supra note 14, at 135-50.
39 See RAKOVE, supra note 18, at 216-18.
40 See RICHARD B. MORRis, THE FORGiNG OF THE UNION 1781-1789, at 80-110 (1987);
JACK N. RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NAIONALPOLMCS: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE
CONTNENTAL CONGRESS 337-42 (1979); WOOD, supra note 14, at 354-62.
41 See MORONE, supra note 26, at 58, 61; RAKOVE, supra note 18, at 250; WOOD, supra note
14, at 324-26,407.
42 See WOOD, supra note 14, at 403-13,430-38.
43 See id. at 165; MORONE, supra note 26, at 55; RAKOVE, supra note 18, at 203.
44 See WOOD, supra note 14, at 179.
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community." 45 And, even more remarkably, such a group of citizens would
constitute a faction "whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole."46
John Adams, too, had utterly abandoned his vision of the legislature as a microcosm
of the people. By the 1780s, Adams had reverted to an American theory of the
"balanced Constitution" even less democratic in its sympathies than Madison's. 47
When the Philadelphia delegates set out to structure the new national
government, to design its principal institutions, and to allocate its powers, it was the
problem of representation that loomed largest before them. The problem of
representation cast an enormous shadow precisely because no formulaic version of
representation could plausibly solve the full panoply of practical political problems
that beset the new nation. And yet, there was no doubt in anyone's mind that, if
those problems were to be overcome, representation was the key. If we are now to
interpret the separation of powers with anything like fidelity to the original vision,
it must be with this point in mind. Underlying the design of institutions and the
allocation of government powers was a central challenge-how to solve the
conundrum of representing the people in a way that promised a sound, stable,
faithful, and energetic government devoted to the public interest, properly
understood.
III. FROM THE CONSTITUTIONAL PERIOD TO OUR OWN
It may seem that I have wandered far afield from my original concern-
whether to favor a strongly presidentialist theory of constitutional design or a
theory, instead, that embraces a robust view of checks and balances. The latter
theory approves, for example, a strong role for Congress in shaping (but not
performing) the execution of the laws, as well as a vigorous role for courts in
constraining the executive according to statute, and constraining both elected
branches to observe constitutional principle. But I want to draw for you a contrast.
It is a contrast between the highly nuanced and eminently pragmatic view of
representation that animated the Constitution versus the formalistic and reductionist
view of governance that animates modem presidentialism.
The Philadelphia delegates recognized that they wanted a government
characterized by a great many qualities that suggest, all in all, the need for an
extraordinary and dynamic pursuit of balance. Theirs was, in Gordon Wood's
phrase, a "dnetic theory of politics."48 On one hand, a new national legislature was
to embody, through the House of Representatives, "an immediate dependence on,
45 THEFEDERALIST No. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
46 Id.
47 See WOOD, supra note 14, at 574-80.
48 Id. at 605.
[Vol. 60:693
COMPLEXITIES OF REPRESENTATION
and an intimate sympathy with, the people."49 On the other hand, the legislature was
to temper the passions and inexperience to which popular assemblies might fall prey
with a more stable perspective, institutionalized in the Senate, based on experience
and expertise. In order that national needs might be addressed effectively, Congress
was to enjoy broad discretion in the making of law, and the executive was to have
the energy necessary for sound administration-the "true test of a good
government," according to Hamilton.50 At the same time, both elected branches
would be accountable to an unelected judiciary, protected as to both tenure and
salary and authorized "to guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals." 51
And perhaps most ambitiously, the Philadelphia delegates recognized the
bewildering diversity of interests among the people, and eschewed any reliance on
the fiction of homogeneous public sentiment. They configured the government's
principal institutions to mirror different constituencies and to follow different modes
and terms of election. All were calculated to insure that local, state, and national
perspectives would be distinctly articulated and given due weight in a new
government in which reason would ultimately predominate over passion.
The framers understood their new governmental design to be revolutionary in
its approach to representation, but note the qualities of representation that
predominated. These were, first, the quality of delegation-that the people had a
hand, whether direct or indirect, in constituting every branch of government,
legislative, executive, and judicial, and second, the fiduciary character of the
government, the obligation of every portion to pursue the true welfare of all the
people. In the words of James Wilson:
The executive and judicial powers are now drawn from the same source, are
now animated by the same principles, and are now directed to the same ends, with
the legislative authority: they who execute, and they who administer the laws, are
so much the servants, and therefore as much the friends of the people, as those who
make [the laws].52
In this pervasively representative government, people could be assured the
legitimacy of government action-but not, primarily, because of any necessary
congruence between government action and immediate popular sentiment. What
would serve the people would be the combined personal qualities of those they
chose to govern them, and an institutional imperative resulting from the tangle of
checks and balances-the imperative of deliberation. In the words of Hamilton:
49 THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, at 327 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
50 THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 414 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
51 TIEFEDERALIST NO. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
5 2 WOOD, supra note 14, at 598 (quoting James Wilson).
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The oftener [a] measure is brought under examination, the greater the diversity in
the situations of those who are to examine it, the less must be the danger of those
errors which flow from want of due deliberation, or of those missteps which
proceed from the contagion of some common passion or interest It is far less
probable that culpable views of any kind should infect all the parts of the
government at the same moment and in relation to the same object than that they
should by turns govern and mislead every one of then 53
Now note, whether the ambitions of Madison, Hamilton, et aL, have been
realized, how utterly pragmatic and functional was their approach. They were not
concerned about the conceptual purity of classifying and distributing powers
according to any Procrustean set of categories. If you asked a member of the
founding generation whether the Senate was of a legislative or executive character,
the likely answer would have been, "Both."54 If you similarly asked to which
elected branch the Secretary of the Treasury was accountable, you would probably
have gotten the same answer.55 If you asked whether the President needed to have
plenary policy control over all subordinate administrators, you probably would have
gotten, "No," or, from a thoughtful observer, "It depends," as your response.56
Conceptualization followed function, not the other way around. Again to quote
Professor Reid: "Americans arrived at their law of representation not by theory but
by experiment. '57
Compare this approach to representation to what Professor Calabresi, with
greatest sophistication among the presidentialists, puts forth as the normative case
for presidentialism. In his view, the President ought to be deemed to have plenary
control over all aspects of administration because his national constituency equips
him uniquely to resist factions, by which Professor Calabresi means "special
interests. 58 How does the national character of the presidency do this?
It cannot be because the President is more likely to be a satisfactory identity-
or interest-surrogate for the people than is Congress or the Judiciary. In that
respect, his unitariness is an obvious disadvantage. He is no more our delegate than
the other branches, nor is he likely to be an effective proxy for voting "our"
preferences. We get to approve any particular President only twice-and vote him
53 THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, at 443 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
54 See JOHN A. ROHR, TO RUN A CONSITriurION: THE LEGmITMACY OF THE ADMJNISTEATIVE
STATE 28-39 (1986).
55 See Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions and
Practices, 30 WM. &MARY L. REv. 211,240-42 (1989).
56 See Peter M. Shane, Independent Policymaking and Presidential Power: A Constitutional
Analysis, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 596, 613-17 (1989).
57 REID, supra note 17, at 6.
58 See Calabresi, Normative Arguments, supra note 6, at 58-70.
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out of office only once. The range of issues on which he must take positions and the
varying intensity with which those issues resonate with the multifarious subgroups
of our population simply preclude the President from reliably representing majority
sentiment. No-for the national character of the President to make him our most
effective bulwark against faction, it must be because he is our most reliable
fiduciary. But, why would this be?
On one hand, it may justly be claimed that the President may be most
acclimated to thinking about problems from a national perspective, which distances
him from local sympathies or allegiances that might distort his calculation of the
public interest. But, as the framers would remind us, the predominance of any one
perspective-national, state, or local-is by itself problematic in pursuit of the
public welfare. The keys to that process are dialogue and deliberation-and it is far
from clear that giving the President plenary policy control over all administration
will ensure either-precisely because the President is least likely to be sensitive to
state and local interests, even when, objectively speaking, they are most salient in
calculating the public interest.
It might also be said, 6. la Hamilton, that the President is most likely to bring
qualities of strong character to the tasks of govemance.59 Having to earn the esteem
of so many, the President presumably must partake of a greater virtue than those
who need impress only a single congressional district or even an entire state. In light
of current events, I can't bring myself to belabor why this argument fails. Think-
John Glenn/Bill Clinton, Morris Udall/Richard Nixon .... You get the point.
Finally, and I think this is Professor Calabresi's main argument, the President
has the least incentive to give in to special interests and the greatest disincentive. 60
Here, I believe, the presidentialists truly are blinking reality. Because of the
enormous costs of election and reelection, exacerbated by the President's role as
chief party fund-raiser, the Chief Executive probably has the greatest interest among
all national politicians in courting and pleasing special interests, by which I mean
interests that would advance themselves through money and the exercise of raw
power rather than reason. Here, the names Trie, Huang, and Riady may prove a
59 This process of election affords a moral certainty that the office of President will seldom
fall to the lot of any man who is not in an eminent degree endowed with the requisite
qualifications. Talents for low intrigue, and the little arts of popularity, may alone suffice to
elevate a man to the first honors in a single State; but it will require other talents, and a
different kind of merit, to establish him in the esteem and confidence of the whole Union, or
of so considerable a portion of it as would be necessary to make him a successful candidate
for the distinguished office of President of the United States. It will not be too strong to say,
that there will be a constant probability of seeing the station filled by characters pre-eminent
for ability and virtue.
THE FEDERALIST No. 68, at 414 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
60 See Calabresi, Nornative Arguments, supra note 6, at 67.
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helpful mnemonic device.61
There is much more to be said here. It is clear from Professor Calabresi's
account that his preference for presidential power rests in large part on a denigration
of both Congress and the judiciary.62 Intriguingly, the people do not share the latter
view. Recent polls, for example, show that our federal judiciary is overwhelmingly
the most trusted branch of the national govemment-trusted "a great deal" or "a fair
amount" by over 70% of the population.63 But one need not romanticize either
Congress or court to see in the presidentialist view of separation of powers an
implausibly utopian account of the executive.
This does not mean I disagree with all presidentialist proposals. The line-item
veto, which Professor Calabresi advances as a weapon in the President's struggle
against faction, is still a device worthy of experimentation for its potential
contribution to presidential involvement in genuine dialogue with Congress over
appropriations policy.64 But my analysis does indicate that, examined most
generally, presidentialism is not just doctrinally off-base; it is normatively
misguided.
Our constitutional legacy is a tripartite national government that in different
ways and through different mechanisms provides us with a co-equal trio of
representative institutions. Whatever appreciation of our diversity led the framers
to elevate deliberation among such institutions as the key to legitimate action, we
can only redouble or even re-triple our recognition of that diversity today. Whatever
concem for stability led them in an eighteenth century world to understand the risks
61 The allegations against these three individuals in connection with fund-raising for the 1996
Democratic presidential campaign are briefly summarized in James A. Barnes et al., The Next
Special Counsel?, NAT'LJ., Sept. 12, 1998, at 2090,2093-94.
62 See Calabresi, Normative Arguments, supra note 6, at 50-57.
63 See Gallup Poll Survey, Dec. 28-Dec. 29,1998, available in Westlaw, Poll Database, Oct.
8, 1998 (Descriptors: Confidence; Govemment; Courts). Respondents typically were queried as
follows: "As you know, our federal govemment is made up of three branches: an executive branch,
headed by the President, ajudicial branch, headed by the U.S. (United States) Supreme Court, and
a legislative branch, made up of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives. Let me ask you
how much trust and confidence you have at this time in ... the judicial branch, headed by the U.S.
Supreme Court?.. I" d.
64 Following Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998), however, which invalidated the
1996 Line Item Veto Act, 2 U.S.C. § 691 et seq. (1994 & Supp. I[), Congress would now have to
reauthorize the line-item veto in a form that would not run afoul of the Supreme Court's formal
understanding of the legislative process. A legislative proposal that would accomplish this
objective would involve the automatic transformation of every appropriations measure into
individual line-item bills that would have to be either approved or vetoed separately by the
President In suggesting the possible utility of this experiment in dialogue, I would add, however,
that I think it unlikely to have significant impact on the overall fiscal performance of the national




and the dangers posed by tyrannical majorities, we can only feel more intensely in
a world where the potential tools of oppression are so much more numerous and
more potent.
What is ironic, because I believe it is overlooked or denigrated in the
presidentialist literature, is that the executive's strongest claim as an important
check against faction is its capacity to develop expertise. This is itself a big topic,
but, if I am right, then it is certainly even less clear that the President's comparative
advantage in the struggle to constrain the impulses of faction demands the plenary
policy control over administration that the presidentialists recommend. It may be
that providing administrators some tenure protection to ensure robust dialogue
within the executive branch would be a better idea.65
Modem presidentialism depends on a view of our political process that is, in
my judgment, naively mechanical. It is unduly cynical about our political
possibilities and unduly utopian in its hopes for the presidency. In deciding on the
view of separation of powers we ought to embrace, we should never forget that our
separation of powers is intended to foster the fiduciary, deliberative quality of our
uniquely representative government. When we stop seeing the People's reflection
equally in the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary, it can only be because
we-or they-have forgotten or betrayed the multidimensional character of the
constitutional ideal.
65 See generally William V. Luneburg, Civic Republicanism, the First Amendment, and
Executive Branch Policymalang, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 367 (1991).
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